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MERCHANTS LIABILITY IN SOUTH
CAROLINA FOR INJURIES ON THE
PREMISES-AN ANACHRONISM
JOHN J. McKAY*
Daily life has undergone radical change in the last fifty years.
Automobiles are now almost a necessity to normal existence. Even air
conditioning is rapidly becoming so. Airplanes and the possibilities of
travel, even for short periods of time, to distant and exotic places are
part of our culture.
Formerly people grew up in one place, their children and grand-
children lived nearby. Property might have remained in the family for
generations. The family home took an extended time to build. The
neighbors were all known and, if the town was small, everyone knew
everyone else.
The family doctor was a personal friend who probably spent more
time out of his office making house calls than in it. People knew the
local merchant or grocer and he knew them by name. Items purchased
were relatively few and simple and selling was from personal contact
rather than mass advertising. The quality of the cloth or suit purchased
could normally be evaluated by the husband and the wife who made
or mended the clothes. Food was purchased by the item, and probably
more often than not produced by a person known to the purchaser. It
was not canned, bagged or in frozen food containers. Cloth was wool
or cotton or perhaps linen and it was neither chemically produced nor
wrinkle resistent. Tools were simple; toys and normally made of wood.
In the last few decades technology has advanced more rapidly than
perhaps at any comparable period in history. Living styles have been
completely altered. Our great grandparents would be startled and prob-
ably unbelieving if they could be transported to the United States in
1971.
The laws, which govern our lives, have changed as our lives have
changed. Of course, few laws are universal and the vast majority lack
relevance out of their time and place.
In recent years South Carolina laws relating to consumers have
* A.B., J.D., University of South Carolina; partner in the firm of Rainey, Fant &
McKay, Greenville, South Carolina.
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undergone considerable revision. Some changes have been made by the
Legislature. One example is the statute enacted in 1966 abolishing the
privity requirement in products cases;' another, also appended to the
Uniform Commercial Code, is a long-arm statute to facilitate service
of process.' Most such changes, however, have been judicial. For exam-
ple in Mickle v. Blackmon,' our court became a forerunner in the
country through the standards it set for automobile manufacturers.
There is also Springfield v. Williams Plumbing and Heating,4 a some-
what confusing opinion which at least one federal court relied upon in
refusing to strike a cause of action for strict liability in a products
case.
5
In at least one area of consumer protection though, the South
Carolina courts have refused to act. In this area our law is an anachro-
mism both to the conditions of modern life and to the state of our law
in other related areas. This is the law of a merchant's liability for
personal injuries sustained by a customer on the merchant's premises.
A merchant is, of course, liable for personal injuries to a member
of the public by reason of his negligence. Where such injuries occur by
reason of a hazard existing in the store itself, however, in this state the
injured person must prove that the hazard was either created by the
merchant or was one of which he was either actually or constructively
aware.
Let us suppose a person goes into a supermarket to shop for the
week's groceries. Let us further suppose that person slips and falls on
some item of produce left on the floor, or cuts his foot or hand on a
piece of glass from a broken bottle formerly containing merchandise,
or has a stack of canned goods topple over on him. While he technically
has a cause of action against the merchant, he must prove in each case
either how the defective condition came about, or that the merchant
was aware of it, or that it existed long enough for the merchant to be
charged with knowledge. How does the injured person go about this?
In most cases he doesn't, because it is an impossible burden of proof.
Perhaps such legal requirements were once fair. When the store
was small, the pace slow and the customers known to each other and
to the merchant, an injured person could very possibly in the majority
I. S. C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-318 (1966 Supp,).
2. S. C. CODE ANN. § 10.2-803 (1966 Supp.).
3. 252 S.C. 202, 166 S.E.2d 173 (1969).
4. 249 S.C. 130, 153 S.E.2d 184 (1967).
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of cases pinpoint the time and nature of the failure. In the same way,
even at the present day, such a defect in a normal home can most often
be traced back to its source; however, such a requirement has lost any
relevance it might once have had in the case of the modern merchant.
Modern stores promote an aura of neatness, cleanliness and effi-
ciency.' The normal customer does not consciously anticipate the possi-
bility of being injured in such a store in the same respect that we do
not consciously anticipate the possibility that our clothes will suddenly
catch fire, that we may be poisoned from some substance in the china
that we buy or that we may be injured when some part of our automo-
bile suddenly malfunctions. A merchant in the present day, of course,
sells his store as well as his product, and his entire operation is his
business.
South Carolina law of premises liability began in 1927 in rather
confusing fashion. In Bradford v. F. W. Woolworth Co. 7 the plaintiff
claimed she was injured when she fell after slipping in an accumulation
of oil left on the defendant's oiled floor. The jury found for the plaintiff
and the supreme court affirmed. Chief Justice Watts wrote the princi-
pal opinion, in which no other justice concurred. Analogizing from the
duty a master owed his servant to provide a safe place to work, Chief
Justice Watts held that once an injury was shown to have resulted from
an unsafe condition of the store a prima facie case of negligence was
made out against the store owner, and the burden of exonerating him-
self was then cast on the owner. Mr. Justice Blease wrote a concurring
opinion, in which justices Carter and Stabler joined, holding that the
burden of proof always remained on the plaintiff, but under the facts
of that case there was evidence of negligence to go to the jury. Mr.
Justice Cothran dissented. He agreed with the three concurring justices
on the burden of proof; however, he argued there was no evidence of
negligence. He stated that the plaintiff was required to show an unsafe
condition resulting from an accumulation of oil on the floor and that
6. The growth of the modern supermarket is one illustration of this change. It has
been traced in some detail by Mr. Justice Terrell in Carl's Markets, Inc. v. Defeo, 55
So. 2d 182 (Fla. 1952). He describes the indicia of the supermarket which really began
as late as 1936, to be the basket cart, self service, volume sales, minimum prices, show-
manship, large and frequent turnover, small net profit, unique arrangement, color scheme
attraction, Friday and Saturday specials, circus stunts in some places and many other
attractions. It makes the best use of color therapy to arrest the attention. It is frequented
by hundreds and thousands of customers every day and the mural attractions and food
displays are often spectacular and so consuming they break down purchase resistance
and encourage impulse buying.
7. 141 S.C. 453,140 S.E. 105 (1927).
19711
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this condition was or should have been known to the store. He did not
feel this requisite knowledge was established by the evidence. The
store's employee, who was in charge of putting the oil on the floor, did
not testify, no reason for this being given in the published opinion.
However, there seemed no question that the oil was put on the floor
by this employee in the course of his employment. Mr. Justice Cothran
seemed to ignore the fact that the store should have been liable in such
a case whether or not the oil's presence was later known.
In the second case, Pope v. Carolina Theater' which perhaps is
not exactly in point but is often cited, the plaintiff alleged that she was
in the defendant's theater when an unknown person released a stench
bomb which caused her to become nauseated. As she arose from her
seat and started out of the theater, her foot caught in the carpeting and
she fell. This was the only testimony at the trial. In appealing a nonsuit,
the plaintiff argued that the defendant was the insurer of the safety of
its customers. Mr. Justice Cothran, writing for a unanimous court,
denied this contention, citing from the concurring opinion in Bradford,
and held that there was no evidence of any defect in the premises.
In the similar case of Perry v. Carolina Theater' the plaintiff
claimed that he was injured when bitten by a dog in the defendant's
theater. The court held that the presence of the dog in and of itself was
not sufficient to establish liability and reiterated its prior position that
the owner was not an insurer of the safety of his customers, but going
one step further, the court held the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which
did not otherwise apply in South Carolina, would not apply in such
cases.
The next real case in this area, Anderson v. Belk-Robinson Co.,"
is again strange because of the theory used by the court. There, the
plaintiff slipped on an oily substance which was part of a sweeping
compound put on the floor by the defendant. The court reasoned that
the jury could have inferred by the color of the substance that it had
been on the floor a sufficient time for the store employees to have
discovered it by a proper inspection, and held that the defendant was
8. 172 S.C. 161, 173 S.E. 305 (1934).
9. 180 S.C. 130, 185 S.E. 184 (1936).
10. 192 S.C. 132, 5 S.E.2d 732 (1939). Again, in Pace v. J. C. Penney & Co., 182
S.C. 127, 188 S.E. 659 (1936) the plaintiff claimed she slipped and fell on a slippery
substance on the defendant's stairs. The court held she had not sustained her contentions
in this regard. In Bagwell v. McLellan Stores Co., 216 S.C. 207, 57 S.E.2d 257 (19,19)
the plaintiff claimed she slipped on an excessively slick place in the defendant's store,
but the court held she had not substantiated her allegations.
[Vol. 23
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therefore liable because of constructive notice. It would again have
seemed simple enough for the court to have reasoned that the defen-
dant's employees put the substance on the floor and the defendant was,
thereby, liable for the act of these employees in creating the dangerous
condition.
In the next two important cases, the applicability in certain instan-
ces of this latter theory was made clear; however, no mention was made
of the prior inconsistent opinions. In the first," a customer spilled salad
oil on the floor and the defendant's employees attempted to clean it up.
A short while later the area was pronounced safe and customers al-
lowed in. The plaintiff walked through the area and fell on some of the
salad oil that was left on the floor. The court held it was a jury question
whether the store had exercised due care in the manner in which the
cleaning was done or the time allowed for drying before customers were
allowed in.
In the second case,' 2 the plaintiff fell over some boxes placed in
the store by a distributor under the store's direction. Although the
verdict for the plaintiff was reversed on other grounds and the case
remanded for a new trial, the court stated that it felt there was sufficient
evidence of negligence to go to the jury since the defendant had overseen
the placement of the boxes.
Surprisingly enough if one discounts Perry," which may not be
analogous and where there was no real attempt to come within the
framework of existing law, it was not until 1957 that the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court was squarely presented with a case in which an
injury was caused to a customer from a condition not shown to have
been created by a store or its employees. The various cases, however,
had built up a body of what might be termed hornbook law, although
they had never really had an appropriate occasion to apply it. Each
case had been built upon the other. By quoting these principles they
"established" the law, although it had never been necessary for any
decision."4 Whether these principles might have been dicta or not,
II. Mullinax v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 221 S.C. 433, 70 S.E.2d 911 (1952).
12. Richards v. Great AtI. & Pac. Tea Co., 226 S.C. 119, 83 SE.2d 917 (1954).
13. 180S.C. 130, 185 S.E. 184.
14. This is reiterated in Hunter v. Dixie Home Stores, 232 S.C. 139, 143-44, 101
S.E.2d 262, 264-65 (1957) as follows:
In the case of Anderson v. Belk-Robinson Co., 192 S.C. 132,5 S.E.2d
732, 733, this Court announced the following rule:
"In Bradford v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 141 S.C. 453, 140 S.E. 105,
we laid down the rule, deduced from the weight of authority, that a mer-
1971]
5
McKay: Merchants Liability in South Carolina for Injuries on the Premise
Published by Scholar Commons, 1971
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Hunter v. Dixie Homes Stores'5 settled the matter.
In Hunter the plaintiff claimed that she slipped on some green
beans which were in the aisle of the defendant's store. She had entered
the store to purchase a pound of butter. The vegetable bin was between
the place where the butter was located and the point where she entered
the store. When she entered the store, she saw the defendant's cashier
standing near the cash register looking down the aisle which contained
the green beans and approximately ten feet from the place the plaintiff
fell. The plaintiff also saw another employee working about twenty-five
to thirty feet from this area. She walked into the area, slipped on the
beans and fell. This constituted the principal evidence for the plaintiff.
A verdict in her favor was reversed and a verdict entered for the defen-
dant on the ground that there had been a failure to establish construc-
tive notice of the presence of the beans on the floor. The court in its
opinion stressed the fact that the plaintiff had not shown either how
the beans got on the floor or how long they had been there before the
accident. The court tended to slough over the fact that apparently two
store employees could easily have seen the beans if they had cared to
look. In fact, apparently one employee was looking toward the area as
the plaintiff approached it. There is no mention in the opinion that
other customers were in the area and presumably this was not the case.
The court did not state the evidence given by the two employees, or even
say whether they testified at all.
In the early part of 1969 the court seemingly put the icing on the
defendant's cake in two cases decided less than a month apart."5
chant who invites the public to his premises is not an insurer of the safety
of his patrons, and is therefore not liable for injuries caused by some defect
in the premises, in the absence of any evidence tending to show that he or
his agents knew or should have known, by the exercise of reasonable
diligence, of the defect. This principle was reaffirmed in Pope v. Carolina
Theater, 172 S.C. 161, 173 S.E. 305; Perry v. Carolina Theater, 180 S.C.
130, 185 S.E. 184."
15. 232 S.C. 139, 101 S.E.2d 262; see note 14supra,
16. Wimberly v. Winn-Dixie, Inc., 252 S.C. 117, 165 S.E.2d 627 (1969); Penning-
ton v. Zayre Corp., 252 S.C. 176, 165 S.E.2d 695 (1969). In the interim the court had
decided Baker v. Clark, 233 S.C. 20, 103 S.E.2d 395 (1958), where the plaintiff fell on a
shellacked or waxed floor. The case, however, was determined on contributory negligence
and assumption of the risk rather than initial negligence of the defendant. Another
interim case was Gilliland v. Pearce Motor Co., 235 S.C. 268, 111 S.E.2d 521 (1959)
where the plaintiff, a laundryman, while deliverying uniforms to the defendant's employ-
ees, slipped on some grease in the defendant's service area. The decision is generally
uninformative as the court affirmed a verdict N.O. V. for the defendant, quoting large
[Vol. 23
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In the First of these, Wimberly v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc.,' 7 the
plaintiff fell on some rice left on the floor of the defendant's supermar-
ket. The store had been swept shortly before 8:00 a.m. on the morning
in question and the plaintiff fell between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m. Business
activity that day had been minimal and there was no testimony that
any other customers had walked down the aisle in question prior to the
time of the plaintiff's fall. The rice was on the floor in an area of the
store other than that in which it was displayed for sale. The floor was
a variegated color, a large part of which was white, and upon which
rice was difficult to detect. There were four employees in the store, two
of whom, the assistant acting manager and the produce manager
(whose duty encompassed keeping the floors clean) had been back and
forth through the area that morning. The produce manager inspected
and patrolled every ten or fifteen minutes examining the floor for items
dropped on it. The court in a sharply divided 3-2 decision reversed a
verdict for the plaintiff on the ground that there was no evidence of
constructive knowledge on the part of the store.
In the second case, Pennington v. Zayre Corp.," the plaintiff was
injured when she slipped on a plastic bag on the floor of the defendant's
store. Two daughters of the plaintiff testified that the bag was of the
same type as bags in which blouses were displayed on the adjacent
table. They further testified that two or three other bags of the same
kind were on the floor near the plaintiff at the time of her fall and that
an employee of the store was in the immediate area at the time of the
fall. Another shopper testified that she also saw several more plastic
bags and that she had noticed such bags on the floor of the store on
previous shopping occasions. The court, this time in a unanimous deci-
sion, affirmed an involuntary nonsuit on the ground that there was no
evidence of constructive notice.
Some six months later, in August of 1969, the court decided Orr
v. Saylor19 and at least some indication was given of a possible change
in the judicial climate. The decision of Mr. Justice Brailsford followed
excerpts from Hunter. supra note 14. There were also a number of federal cases applying
South Carolina law. See, e.g., Joye v. Great Atil. & Pac. Tea Co., 405 F.2d 464 (4th Cir.
1968); H. L. Green Co. v. Bowen, 223 F.2d 523 (4th Cir. 1955); Mullen v. Winn-Dixie
Stores, Inc., 252 F.2d 232 (4th Cir. 1958).
17. 252 S.C. 117, 165 S.E.2d 627.
18. 252 S.C. 176, 165 S.E.2d 695.
19. 253 S.C. 155, 169 S.E.2d 396 (1969). There is a later case, Phillips v. K-Mart,
254 S.C. 150, 173 S.E.2d 916 (1970), which is largely uninformative. See also Bootle v.
Labrasca, Inc., 255 S.C. 134, 177 S.E.2d 545 (1970); cf. Blount v. McCrory Const. Co.,
254 S.C. 608, 176 S.E.2d 407 (1970).
1971]
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the traditional lines and reversed a verdict for the plaintiff. On the other
hand, the dissent of Acting Associate Justice Weatherford made a
striking divergence in cogently arguing for the adoption of res ipsa
loquitur and the application of that doctrine to such cases. Mr. Justice
Brailsford's majority opinion concluded with the following unusual
paragraph almost inviting an appeal concerning the points raised in the
dissent:
In his able dissent, Mr. Actng Associate Justice Weatherford
urges with considerable logic that this court should re-examine its
oft stated position with respect to the res ipsa loquitur rule. Per-
haps, in an appropriate case, we should do so and consider whether
we have heretofore, while denying the rule by name, followed it in
substance in applying the circumstantial evidence rule. We are not,
however, convinced that this case is factually appropriate for this
purpose. Furthermore, we have not been requested to re-examine
our position on this appeal, and the issue has not been briefed by
counsel.
20
In Orr the facts do not follow the usual pattern in these cases and
perhaps the decision is justified without regard to the present state of
South Carolina law. Here, the plaintiff's automobile, which she was
driving in the rain, became grounded on a cement traffic divider. She
walked to the defendant's service station and asked for assistance. An
employee of the defendant dislodged the automobile and drove it into
the grease bay area of the station where the automobile was then
parked over the grease pit. The employee got out of the car and walked
around to make a quick inspection of the underside of the car. After
he got out, the plaintiff stated she was afraid they would raise the car
or "lower" it, so she got out and walked to the front of the car. As
she was standing there, she saw grease on the pavement and at the same
time slipped on it and fell into the pit.
The plaintiff had been left in a position of safety in the car where
certainly the defendant anticipated she would remain, but instead, on
her own initiative, she got out and entered an area of the station in
which she testified she knew she might expect to encounter grease or
oil. It would seem, therefore, that the case might equitably have been
decided on the basis of the plaintiff's contributory negligence as a
matter of law,2 even assuming initial negligence on the defendant's
part.
20. 253 S.C. at 185, 169 S.E.2d at 397.
21. See Bolen v. Strange, 192 S.C. 284, 6 S.E.2d 466 (1939); Baker v. Clark, 233
S.C. 20, 103 S.E.2d 395 (1958).
[Vol. 23
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This then is the present state of South Carolina law in this area. 22
Unquestionably there is need for a revision.
South Carolina is, however, not alone in its present position by
any means. American Law Reports contains an extensive annotation2
enumerating cases from all states, the majority of which undoubtedly
follow the law as presently stated in South Carolina. There have been
numerous attempts by plaintiffs in these other states to escape the
harshness of the general law. For example, in one case the plaintiff
attempted to establish that the store owner warranted the condition of
the store.2 In another, the plaintiff, analogizing his case with that of
the products liability cases, attempted to persuade the court to carry
over the products liability doctrine of strict liability. 5 Both of these
attempts were unsuccessful.
The Florida case of Carl's Markets, Inc. v. Defeo21 is fascinating
and illustrative of the uncertainty and soul searching by at least one
modern court to determine a just result in these cases. There the plain-
tiff entered the defendant's self-service grocery store, which had been
swept approximately fifteen minutes before and she was injured when
she slipped on a green bean. The bin where beans were displayed had
apparently been overfilled. The store had no knowledge that the bean
was on the floor prior to the plaintiff's accident, but the case was
allowed to go to the jury and a verdict for the plaintiff resulted.
On appeal to the Florida Supreme Court, the matter was origi-
nally heard by five of the seven justices. The original opinion, in which
four justices concurred and one dissented, reversed the judgment,
applying what appears generally to be present South Carolina law. A
22. The latest case is Anderson v. Winn-Dixie Civil No. 19296 (S.C., filed Oct. 6,
1971). There the plaintiff slipped on a banana peel in the defendant's supermarket. As
he helped her up, the produce manager stated that the store should have had the place
cleaned up but they just hadn't gotten around to it. The court in a 3-2 decision reversed
a verdict for the plaintiff. The two dissenting justices argued that there was sufficient
evidence for the jury. Neither group questioned the "traditional" law.
23. Annot., 61 A.L.R.2d 6 (1956). This and the immediately following related
annotations run over two hundred pages. There is, in addition, extensive supplementa-
tion.
24. Thomason v. Great Atil. & Pac. Tea Co., 294 F. Supp. 222 (E.D.Va. 1968).
25. Jones v. Jarvis, 437 S.W.2d 189 (Ky. 1969).
26. 55 So.2d 182 (Fla. 195 1); this case was cited by the plaintiff unsuccessfully in
Wimberly v. Winn-Dixie, Greenville, Inc., 252 S.C. 117, 165 S.E.2d 627 (1969); it is
referred to in Orr v. Saylor, 253 S.C. 155, 169 S.E.2d 396 (1969)b (dissenting opinion).
1971]
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rehearing was granted and the case was heard by all seven justices. The
former opinion was negated and the judgment for the plaintiff was
affirmed, per curiam without opinion, with three justices concurring,
one of whom formerly concurred in the prior opinion and then changed
sides; the former dissenting justice concurred specially, and three jus-
tices dissented and adhered to the prior opinion. A second motion for
a rehearing was denied.
The opinion of Mr. Justice Terrell who concurred specially in the
final result, is quite interesting both from its discussion of modern
supermarket techniques and also with regard to its theory of liability.
In general summary, Mr. Justice Terrell stated that reasonable care
was without question the rule governing stores and many other business
places in the old days; however, those days are gone.
It would be as reasonable, according to Mr. Justice Terrell, to
contend that the proprietor of a horse drawn vehicle should be governed
by the same rule of care as the proprietor of a motor driven vehicle.
The laws must change to promote human progress and should square
with the changing social and economic conditions. The operator of any
business must be required to use the degree of care commensurate with
the kind of danger of the business he is engaged in. He felt that the
evidence showed a complete lack of that degree of care, not only in
looking after the floors, but also in the construction of the vegetable
bins which were over filled at the time of the accident.
From a close reading of this opinion, it would appear that he
would impose something close to strict liability on the modern store.
Apparently the other justices who voted for affirmance were not willing
to go so far and, at the same time, did not feel obliged to state exactly
what their position would be.
While Mr. Justice Terrell's position is perhaps an extreme one, it
does have merit in enumerating the complete change from the old
marketing techniques, under which general law was formtflated, to the
modern ones.Y
The most original opinion of which this writer is aware, however,
and possibly the most useful to South Carolina, is that of New Jersey
Chief Justice Weintraub in Wollernan v. Grand Union Stores, Inc.
2
S
27. See note 6, supra.
28. 47 N.J. 426, 221 A.2d 513 (1966).
[Vol. 23
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There the plaintiff was shopping for green peppers in the vegetable
section of the defendant's supermarket. She slipped and fell when she
stepped on a string bean. Nearby, but not waiting on her, was an
employee of the defendant. The evidence did not show how the bean
fell to the floor or how long it had been there before the accident. The
trial court, relying on general law, dismissed the case on a nonsuit,
holding that there was no proof that the defendant either knew the bean
was on the floor or that the bean had been there long enough to permit
an inference that the defendant knew of it.
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous opinion.
Chief Justice Weintraub stated that someone was negligent, in that
vegetable debris carries an obvious risk of injury to a pedestrian. A
prudent man would not place it in an aisle or permit it to remain there.
He went on to say, that when greens are sold from open bins on a self
service basis, there is a likelihood that some will fall or be dropped to
the floor. If the operator chooses to sell them this way, he must do what
is reasonably necessary to protect the customer from the risk of injury
that such a mode of operation is likely to generate; and this whether
the risk arises from the act of his employee or of someone else whom
he invites to the premises. The operator's vigilance must be commen-
surate with that risk.
According to Chief Justice Weintraub, the hazard could have been
caused by carelessness in the manner in which the beans were piled and
displayed, or the carelessness of an employee in handling the beans, or
the carelessness of an employee in handling the beans, or the careless
of a patron. As to the first two, the store was chargeable whether or
not it was aware of its employee's neglect. If the bean was dropped by
a customer, since the customer's carelessness was to be anticipated in
the self service operation, the defendant was liable, even without notice
of the beans presence on the floor, if he failed to use reasonable measure
commensurate with the risk involved to discover them and remove
them before they injured the plaintiff.
Overall, the fair probability was that the defendant did less than
its duty demanded in one respect or another. This probability, accord-
ing to Chief Justice Weintraub, is sufficient to permit an inference of
negligence, in the absence of evidence that the defendant did all a
reasonably prudent person might do in the light of the risk of injury
11
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which the operation entailed. Because of this, he held that it was just
to place the onus of producing evidence upon the party, in that case
the store, which was possessed of superior knowledge or opportunity
for explanation of the causative circumstances.
Even though it was acknowledged that the court's views did not
square completely with the standard approach to the problem, the
court held:
[t]hat where a substantial risk of injury is implicit in the manner
in which a business is conducted, and on the total scene it is fairly
probable that the operator is responsible either in creating the
hazard or permitting it to arise or to continue, it would be unjust
to saddle the plaintiff with the burden of isolating the precise
failure. The situation being peculiarly in the defendant's hands, it
is fair to call upon the defendant to explain, if he wishes to avoid
an inference by the trier of the facts that the fault probably was
his.29
The adoption of such a doctrine in South Carolina would not
make the store the insurer of the safety of its patrons, and while it
would be in accord with the principles advocated by Acting Justice
Weatherford in Orr, it would not require the adoption of res ipsa
loquitur generally or the application of that doctrine to this type of
case. In addition, it would be in accord with prior South Carolina
decisions shifting the burden of proof in cases of bailments,30 bank
depositor, 31 passenger-carrier,32 and master-servant.? All of these are
analogous.
29. 47 N.J. at 430, 221 A.2d at 515. In Childres v. Gas Lines, Inc., 248 S.C. 316,
149 S.E.2d 761 (1966) a traffic sign was left at a construction site by the defendant,
supposedly in a safe place off the road. A third party later collided with the sign leaving
debris from the sign in the road. The plaintiff, driving a motorcycle, later came by and
was injured when his motorcycle collided with the debris. In sustaining a verdict for the
plaintiff, the court stated:
When a thing which causes injury is shown to be under the manage-
ment of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course
of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the
defendant, that the accident arose from want of care. 248 S.C. at 323, 149
S.E.2d at 764.
It is frankly difficult to ind a distinction between the two statements of law.
30. Gilliland v. Peters Dry Cleaning Co., 195 S.C. 417, II S.E.2d 857 (1940).
31. Carroll v. South Carolina National Bank, 211 S.C. 406,45 S.E.2d 729 (1947).
32. Sutton v. Southern Railway Co., 82 S.C. 345, 64 S.E. 401 (1909).
33. For a summary of these cases see Bradford v. Woolworth Co., 141 S.C. 453,
140 S.E. 105 (1927).
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If the court shifted the burden of proof in such cases, whether
under a doctrine of res ipsa loquitur or under the general principles
enumerated in Wollerman, a great many of the evils of the present
system would be eliminated. It would do much to insure that the true
facts are brought to light. It would not penalize a store which makes a
careful investigation of the accident, the results of which can now be
discovered for the plaintiff under state court discovery techniques. In
addition, it would do much to prevent conscious or unconscious fraud
by the plaintiff. Under the present system a store is encouraged not to
find out what happened. On the other hand, a plaintiff, once learning
the state of the law, is encouraged to locate a friend or relative who
was in the store prior to the accident to establish the length of time the
object was on the floor. This friend or relative in all probability did not
pay much attention to the floor and is really not in a position to say
what the condition of the floor was at the time of the occurrence. After
hearing the plaintiff's pitiful tale, that person, feeling sorry for the
plaintiff, thinks back and often quite unconsciously "remembers" the
plastic bag or the beans being on the floor sometime prior to the
accident, when that may well not have been the case. The question
mark in the witness's mind then becomes a certainty with the passage
of time and the case is decided in the plaintiff's favor through the good
faith but quite erroneous testimony of the witness. The store may be
powerless to contradict this testimony, having relied on the present
state of the law in its favor and the fact that its investigation was geared
so that it might plead complete ignorance.
While perhaps a considerable number of the present directed ver-
dicts in favor of the defendant would be prevented,3 it is submitted that
our law was not established for decisions by judges but rather by juries.
If the evidence for the plaintiff is weak and that for the defendant is
strong, our system of justice presupposes that the jury will find for the
defendant. While at one time it was felt that a jury would always find
against a corporation in favor of an individual, it is doubted that this
theory is entitled to as much credence in modern times as perhaps it
once was.
The plaintiff would still have to prove, of course, that he sustained
34. Our court has held that a presumption of negligence may be destroyed in certain
circumstances by a showing of due care plainly and indisputably. Craig v. Clearwater
Mfg. Co., 189 S.C. 176, 200 S.E. 765 (1938).
1971]
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an injury proximately resulting from an object in the defendant's store
which should not have been where it was, and which was hazardous to
customers.3 Even assuming negligence, there would always be the ques-
tion of the plaintiff's contributory negligence 6 or his assumption of the
risk.
37
Although Acting Justice Weatherford in Orr3" argues for the adop-
tion and application of res ipsa loquitur which the court may or may
not be inclined to do, his statements with regard to the state of present
law in this matter merit careful thought by future South Carolina
courts:
My concern is that South Carolina presently is following an incon-
sistent, double standard. Human rights are involved as well as
property rights. I cannot see that an invitee who sustains personal
injury on premises beyond his management and control is any
more able to prove the negligence of the owner than a customer
who delivers his clothing to a laundry where they are damaged or
his property to a warehouse where it is damaged. Yet there are
strong presumptions which aid in the recovery of the property
damage and none which aid in recovery for human damage ...
The law cannot remain immutable any more than life and its
service to society depends on its ability to meet the challenges of
change. For example, the law of products liability is moving in the
direction of strict liability to the consumer, as I think it should,
and away from privity, implied warranty and negligent manufac-
ture. The law of negligence, too, must take note of the patron in
the super store of today, the patient under medical care with intri-
cate devices in a highly specialized age, the passenger in the air-
plane, the victim of explosions and a myriad of other complex
areas of life.39
35. See Humphries v. McCrory-McLellan Stores Corp., 358 F.2d 901 (4th Cir.
1966) in which the court, applying South Carolina law, reversed a verdict for the plaintiff
and held that the defendant which maintained the entrance to its store with a hole in the
threshold to receive a bolt from the door, was not negligent since there was no foreseeable
risk of harm to a customer who subsequently fell when her high heel went in the hole.
36. Bolen v. Strange, 192 S.C. 284, 6 S.Em2d 466 (1939). See also Rikard v. J C.
Penny Co., 233 F. Supp. 133 (E.D.S.C. 1964).
37. Baker v. Clark, 233 S.C. 20, 103 S.E.2d 395 (1958). The court recently made
clear that the doctrine of assumption of the risk could apply where there is no contractual
relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant. Canady v. Movtschink Beer Distrib-
utors, Inc., 255 S.C. 119, 177 S.E.2d 475 (1970). Of course a defendant cannot invite a
plaintiff into a space not dangerous in itself but from which it is dangerous to exit, and
when the plaintiff discovers the danger after ariving, claim assumption of the risk in
leaving. See Griffin v. Demeyian, 350 Mass. 47, 213 N.E.2d 384 (1965).
38. 253 S.C. 155, 169 S.E.2d 396 (1969).
39. 253 S.C. at 167-68, 169 S.E.2d at 402.
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